The Nature of Ordinary Objects

Author: Guillaume Bucchioni
Year: 2022
Source type: chapter
Raw file: raw/chapters/bucchioni-2022-nature-of-ordinary-objects.md

Summary

Bucchioni proposes a characterization of ordinary objects (tables, cars, churches, trees, cats, humans) by extending Roman Ingarden's theory of cultural objects to all ordinary objects. Ingarden's "purely intentional mode of being" holds that cultural objects depend on both physical objects (mind-independent) and intentional acts (mind-dependent) — they are neither reducible to physical objects nor mere projections of the mind. Bucchioni argues that all ordinary objects share this double dependence: they are distinct from the physical objects (collections of particles) that constitute them (the problem of material constitution), and their existence and persistence depend on collective intentional acts (conventionality, arbitrariness, vagueness). This offers a "third way" between the realism of ordinary objects (ROO) and eliminativism of ordinary objects (EOO).

Key Claims

• Ingarden's four modes of being: absolute (God), ideal (abstract objects, mind-independent, non-spatiotemporal), real (physical objects, mind-independent, spatiotemporal), and purely intentional (mind-dependent: cultural, social, fictional objects). Modes of being are structured by "existential moments" — pairs of opposite ontological dependencies.
• Four pairs of existential moments: (a) autonomous/heteronomous (dependence on the mind), (b) originality/derivativeness (dependence on a creator), (c) self-sufficient/non-self-sufficient (dependence on a larger whole), (d) independence/dependence (dependence on other substances). Cultural objects are heteronomous, derived, self-sufficient, and dependent.
• Cultural objects are distinct from physical objects (the problem of material constitution): a statue (Ludwig) and the clay (Matter) coincide spatially but have different historical and modal properties — Matter can survive a crash, Ludwig cannot. Cultural objects can survive particle replacement (the cathedral of Reims still exists though its building does not); physical objects (mereological sums of particles) cannot.
• Cultural objects possess sensitive qualities (color, hardness, roughness) that physical objects do not: "the physical, material object that forms the building is not endowed with 'sensible' qualities."
• The existence and persistence of cultural objects are intentional. A church requires not just particles but a ceremony of consecration — "acts of consciousness which... do not and cannot bring about a real change in the real world, but which do call into being a certain object." Persistence requires continued acceptance by "a mental community."
• Double dependence of cultural objects: they depend on intentional acts (mediated, not direct — distinguishing them from imaginary objects) and on physical objects. The mediated/generic dependence makes them intersubjective and resistant to individual modification — "I cannot modify a cultural object the way I modify an imagined object because a cultural object does not depend only on me."
• Extension to all ordinary objects: ordinary objects are distinct from the physical objects that constitute them (material constitution applies to all material objects, not just cultural ones). Ordinary objects are subject to vagueness (the sorites/decomposition paradox), and vagueness indicates conventionality, which indicates mind-dependence. Therefore ordinary objects are mind-dependent.
• Ordinary objects have the purely intentional mode of being: they are heteronomous, derived, self-sufficient, and dependent — depending generically on collective intentional acts and on physical objects. This is a "third way" between ROO (ordinary objects are mind-independent physical objects) and EOO (ordinary objects do not exist).

Connections

Concepts: Thing-Ontology · Dwelling · Everyday Life
Authors: Roman Ingarden · Guillaume Bucchioni · Martin Heidegger
Debates:
Related source notes: Habit and Inhabit, Stuff and Trash (Spuybroek 2025)

Direct Quotes

"Social and cultural objects such as money, churches, and flags present a puzzle since they seem, on the one hand, to be entities that clearly — in some sense — depend on minds, and yet, on the other hand, seem to be objective parts of our world." (Thomasson, p. 115–116)

"A determinately ordered heap of building materials is precisely what a 'church' is not, although this heap serves as its real basis (its bearer) and forms the point of departure of the act of consecration." (Ingarden, p. 259)

"It is very probable that the physical, material object that forms the building is not endowed with 'sensible' qualities; that it is neither colored, nor hard, nor bounded by smooth or rough surfaces." (Ingarden, p. 263)

"What is characteristic of conventionality is arbitrariness. This arbitrariness, as I am understanding conventionality, depends on the fact that a convention is the creation of humans." (Heller, p. 43)

"Ordinary objects are purely intentional objects. They are heteronomous, derivative, self-sufficient and dependent."

"This characterization of ordinary objects could be an interesting third way between standard realism (ROO) and eliminativism (EOO)."

Open Questions

• If ordinary objects are mind-dependent (purely intentional), what are the implications for architectural objects — are buildings "cultural objects" in Ingarden's sense, and does this change how we theorize architectural ontology?
• How does Bucchioni's extension of the purely intentional mode of being to all ordinary objects relate to Spuybroek's ontological spectrum of things (object → thing → stuff → trash)?
• Does the "generic dependence on collective intentional acts" adequately capture the social/institutional dimension of architecture, or does it need supplementation from sociological accounts (Bourdieu's habitus/field)?
• Can the "third way" between realism and eliminativism resolve the tension in architectural theory between treating buildings as physical objects vs. as cultural/social productions?