Olympic Gigantism and the Multifaceted Concept of Sports Venues

Olympic Gigantism and the Multifaceted Concept of Sports Venues

Melina Giannakopoulou

Abstract The immense growth in popularity and the universal acceptance of the Olympic ideals has led, amongst others, to an increase in all aspects of Games participation, organization, complexity and cost. Increases in the number of sports, disciplines and events, as well as competing nations, athletes and attending media, have led to a quadrupling in numbers and requirements in all Games-related areas. These increases have affected not only the number of technical officials, workforce, security, volunteers, accommodation and transport, but most notably the number and size of venues and their standards. Through literature review this paper discusses the key factors in connection to the increasing scale and scope of the Olympics and outlines the underlying problems, whilst simultaneously shedding light on the diverse and controversial attributes ascribed to sports venues, which impede their post-Games management.

JEL Classification L83 · Z20 · Z23 · Z28

1 Introduction

According to the initial conception of Baron Pierre de Coubertin the Olympic Games encompassed the romantic notion of a ‘panegyris’, in the sense of a democratic, intercultural assembly and an all-nations inclusive ‘pan-artistic gathering’ (Gold and Gold 2013). Over time, according to Gold and Gold (2013) its modern adaptation was that of “a festival based on the twin pillars of sport and culture that was intended to bring people from all around the world together”.

The immense growth in popularity and the universal acceptance of the Olympic ideals has led, amongst others, to an increase in all aspects of Games participation, organization, complexity and cost. These increases have affected not only the

M. Giannakopoulou (☑)
Department of Sports Organization and Management, Faculty of Human Movement and Quality of Life, University of Peloponnese, Sparta, Greece

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number of technical officials, workforce, security, volunteers, accommodation and transport, but most notably the number and size of venues and their standards.

2 Methodology

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview of the key factors in connection to the increasing scale and scope of the Olympics and a broad perspective on the diverse and controversial attributes ascribed to sports venues. The narrative overview type of literature review, also known as unsystematic narrative review, was adopted as the most appropriate, since it can tackle broader issues and engage in more post hoc theorizing (Baumeister and Leary 1997). Relevant literature was collected primarily through electronic databases, in particular ScienceDirect and Emerald, and scientific journals which scope lies in the field of Olympic studies and sport facilities. Search terms included “Olympic growth”, “Olympic size”, “Olympic facilities”, “flagship venues” and “stadium diplomacy”. All retrieved studies were assessed for relevance to the guideline topic. Studies available in abstract forms, editorials or not in English were excluded.

3 Olympic Gigantism

According to Guttmann (2002) the early editions of the Olympic Games were relatively small, not only regarding participation numbers, but also in regards to the infrastructure used, since financial resources were scarce (Table 1). For instance, due to financial constraints and lack of proper venues the three consecutive Olympics after Athens were held in conjunction with the World’s Fairs (Paris 1900—Exposition Universelle, St. Louis 1904—Louisiana Purchase Exposition, and the London 1908—Franco-British Exhibition).

Influenced by the ideals of Olympism and the spiritual dimension of the Games, early host cities valued the event for the prestigious honor bestowed upon them and saw them not as a financial opportunity rather than a source of pride and inspiration. According to McIntosh (2003 as seen in Gold and Gold 2011) although the economic prospects of the event, especially regarding tourism, were known “it was considered inappropriate to glory in what the Games would do for the city rather for sport and the pleasure of its citizens”.

Over time though, new aspects and potentials of the Games begun to surface, for instance, the possibility to use the event as a way “to propagate potent imagery of national identity” (e.g. Berlin 1936) (Gold and Gold 2013). However, the dramatic change came after the ending of the period of Austerity, when organizers, from the Olympics in Rome in 1960 and onwards, realized that the Games could be used as “a vehicle for change”, and thus Games-related developments could be integrated into broader plans of long-awaited urban projects (Gold and Gold 2013). This strategy

recognized NOC the IOC began to allow athletes from not yet recognized NOC to participate as “independent athletes” (e.g. athletes from South Sudan at London 2010) (Chapppelet 2014). Furthermore, in accordance to the idea of universalism and the all-nations inclusiveness concept, new sports were gradually added in the sports program that had a primarily regional and not an international appeal (Gold and Gold 2011). For instance, the addition of ping-pong and taekwondo resulted in the increase of television audiences in Asia, whereas the addition of handball resulted in a rise of television audiences in Scandinavian countries. In the same vein, the addition of new disciplines such as beach volley and snowboarding aimed to attract and engage younger audiences (Olympic Games Study Commission 2002).

Furthermore, the gradual promotion of women’s role and participation in sports had a direct impact on the Olympic sports program and on the number of athletes competing in the Games (Olympic Games Study Commission 2002). From the Atlanta 1996 Olympics to the Sydney 2000 Olympics 23 new women’s events were added to the competition schedule, including women’s weightlifting and women’s water polo (Olympic Games Study Commission 2002).

An additional factor that has influenced the size and scale of the Olympics is the organization of the Paralympic Games. The forerunner of the Paralympics were the Stoke Mandeville Games (also known as the Wheelchair Games) whose birth coincided with the London Olympics in 1948, and whose name derives from the Greek preposition “para” (beside or alongside) meaning that the Paralympics are the parallel Games to the Olympics and the two movements exist side-by-side (Cashman and Darcy 2008; Frawley and Adair 2013). From the 1988 Seoul Olympics and onwards the Paralympic Games start approximately 2 weeks after the Olympic Closing Ceremony and are now considered as a parallel and integrated event; and even though this development “challenged the core notion of the Olympics as a celebration of bodily perfection”, in essence gave prominence to “the ethos of participation and competition” (Bailey 2008; Gold and Gold 2011), since their initial purpose at the time was to assist the large number of World War Two veterans and civilians who had been injured during wartime. Yet, the knock-on effects and consequences of this double organization were considerable, especially regarding the planning of sports venues and relevant infrastructure, since along with the 26 Olympic sports, 20 Paralympic sports needed to be staged, either in the same or in specially designed venues (Frawley and Adair 2013).

Already since 2000 the IOC Coordination Commission for the Sydney Olympic Games noted in its final report that measures will have to be taken to control the future growth of the Games, which must not be allowed to grow any larger, otherwise they will present a major risk that if not well managed and controlled may result in IOC becoming a victim of its own success (Olympic Games Study Commission 2002).

1With the addition of women’s boxing at London 2012, all the Olympic sports are now open to athletes of both genders (Chapppelet and Parent 2015).
2Official website of the Paralympic Movement (www.paralympic.org).

The serious repercussions of the issue were not lost to IOC. One of Jacques Rogge’s first actions, upon taking up the IOC presidency in 2001, was to set up the Olympic Games Study Commission to examine the scale and scope of the Olympics and propose solutions to manage and contain their size and inherent complexity (Olympic Games Study Commission 2002). In 2003, this commission published a report, making 117 recommendations in five areas: “Games Format, Venues and Facilities, Games Management, Number of Accredited Persons and Service Levels”, but for the most part were either ignored or opposed by Olympic stakeholders (Chappelet and Kuebler 2008).

This blistering rate of growth of the Olympic Games resulted not only in the increase of the required facilities but also of their standards. According to Chappelet (2014) the pursuit for state of the art venues and the requirement to meet all the necessary standards of each specific sport are also to be accounted in the increase of both the cost and the size of the Games, for instance, the artificial courses for canoe/kayak and the cycling tacks are far more expensive than simple venues for judo or fencing, and more difficult to be converted for future uses. Some scholars suggest that the root cause of the rising construction costs can be traced to the construction of iconic and luxurious facilities with no feasibility studies, careful master planning or post-Games demand analysis. The temptation to display innovative designs and construction methods has been described as “hallmark decision making” and is evident in situations where rational decision-making processes, regarding venue costs and future uses, get overridden due to decision makers “monument complex” (Darcy and Taylor 2013).

4 Stadia as Flagships

In its literal meaning the term “flagship” means the most powerful ship of a fleet, which carries the commanding admiral. Beyond the naval realm the term is used to define the best or most prominent product, building, service etc., among a general group. In the construction industry a flagship development is a prestigious project which aims at regional renewal (Smyth 1994).

In the context of mega-events a flagship constitutes an iconic construction which is meant to be a landmark, seeking not only urban renewal but also the promotion and projection of a city’s image and identity, tied into aggressive city-rebranding campaigns. However, the heavily underused flagships build for mega-events such as World Expos, Olympic Games and World Cups caused this formula to come under scrutiny (Deng 2013).

3In his candidature manifesto for the IOC Presidency, he wrote “Common sense should incite us to look at ways of slightly reducing the size, cost and complexity of the Games in order to make them less vulnerable to the future. This approach would enable all continents and regions to organize the Games more easily and would encourage geographical rotation” (Chappelet 2014).

The concern regarding mega-event flagships is that too much attention is given to short-term functions rather than long-term operational performance. According to Deng (2013) the self-evident dilemma of whether they should be constructed or not stems from the fact that it is difficult to justify the vast investment they demand based only on the needs of an ephemeral event if there is not a viable plan of sufficient future uses. Matters of short-term and long-term functional feasibility and future adaptability, as manifestations of the utilitarianism of a venue, must be placed in priority over the symbolism and the architectural greatness in favor of staging a spectacular event; otherwise a flagship may become “a barrier rather than a driver” of the intended urban regeneration (Deng 2013).

For the first modern Olympics in Athens in 1896 only a few facilities needed to be constructed because the Panathenaic Stadium was available for use, and that example was indented by the next host cities (Rosenthal 2017). However, according to Cashman (1999) and Bolz (2012) this was to the detriment of the next two editions of the Games, since the Olympiad in Paris in 1900 and in St. Louis in 1904 invested very little in infrastructure, which resulted in the production of poor spectacle and were consequently overshadowed by the World’s Fairs held in each city at the same time as the Olympics. Following these two Games Pierre de Coubertin asserted for the first time the necessity for a proper stadium for hosting the event (Bolz 2012). The London Olympics in 1908 are considered the turning point of how Olympic related infrastructure is conceived; since it was the first time that a new permanent stadium was planned and constructed (Bolz 2012). The White City Stadium was a multi-purpose arena with a capacity of 93,000 spectators (63,000 seated) and contained tracks for running and cycling, a swimming pool, facilities for wrestling, archery and gymnastic events, along with locker rooms and restaurants (Bolz 2012; Gold and Gold 2011). Yet, even though it was built to last beyond the event, no legacy plan for future uses was elaborated; as a result for nearly 20 years after the Olympics was left unused and in 1985 was demolished (Gold and Gold 2011; Bolz 2012; Darcy and Taylor 2013).

A comparable example is the Olympic Stadium of the Montreal Games in 1976, which was referred as the “Big O” not only because of its circular roof, but also for the abbreviation of “the Big Owe” taking into account not only its construction costs, but also the fact that the scarce post-event usage and the lack of integration with its surrounding region has turned it from an intended symbol of a world-class city, to a “symbol to memorize a three-decade financial predicament; indicating the risks of a sole reliance on the means of spectacular architecture to achieve the end of place making” (Deng and Poon 2013).

According to Swyngedouw et al. (2002) the criticism against flagship projects is based on the belief that they are part and parcel of a new urban economic policy that sees their construction as the main strategy to stimulate economic growth. As a result of this approach of city marketing and new state entrepreneurialism, flagship projects tend to be not only poorly integrated into the wider urban system, but most importantly they end up accentuating social polarization (Swyngedouw et al. 2002). In the same vein, Coakley and Souza (2013) clearly state that the uncomfortable reality is that the designs of modern stadiums are formulated to meet the

requirements of organizers and sponsors and not to serve the actual needs of local communities, and they go on to add that most sports facilities built or renovated for mega-events are “designed to serve as barriers, excluding access by local people”. Increases in ticket pricing in order to pay for construction and operational costs and additional efforts to raise revenues often make them “islands of upscale commercial development that are not accessible to local people” (Coakley and Souza 2013).

Similarly, Harvey (1989) suggests that a shift from the managerial approach towards the entrepreneurial form of action can be discerned regarding the urban policy formulation and the urban governance. In that sense, cities seem to gradually adopt roles which traditionally belonged to the private sector; by implementing business strategies such as speculative growth of real estate, city marketing and promotion. As a result, a new framework of urban policy is created, which focuses on ambitious projects of urban embellishment, backed by public money, aiming to facilitate the flow of private funding; albeit underestimating the dangers of social exclusion and the marginalization of lower income brackets (Harvey 1989).

Mako et al. (2014) place the megalomaniac architecture of the Olympic Games in a wider context stating that while early Olympic Games were a gathering of amateur athletes and enthusiasts, they gradually became a meeting place only for top professional athletes. Thus, they content that the motto “citius, altius, fortius” has become the mental and operational framework not only for the athletes, but for everyone involved with the Olympic project, including the architects. Undoubtedly, mega-events represent both a challenge and an opportunity for the architects who for the most part try to overcome architectural limits by building high-profile architectural monuments and sophisticated innovative landmarks. However, this kind of architectural motivation leads to designing structures that are not compatible with their immediate surroundings (Sklair 2006) and as the stadiums, especially the Olympic ones, were gradually conceived as “unique objects” of technological innovation, their integration with the surrounding urban area declined and thus they were bound to suffer from limited post-event use (Schmidt 2002).

5 Stadia as Diplomatic Instruments

Apart from grandiose urban symbols and hallmarks, sports venues have been used as diplomatic instruments. The so called “Chinese stadium diplomacy” began as a form of foreign aid to African countries in 1956 and gradually evolved as means of gaining political influence and cultivating soft power (Will 2012). By spring 2010, China had built 58 stadia in nearly 30 African nations and its interest extends to Central America, the Caribbean, Oceania and Asia (Alm 2012). According to a 2016

4It has often been noted cynically in the media that, generally, the only amateurs left in the Olympic Movement are the Games organizers (Pound 2016).

survey over 84 stadia have been funded by China over the last 40 years, which were initially known as “friendship stadiums” (Menary 2015).

However, a rigorous examination of the selected countries reveals some carefully concealed agendas: free trade agreements, access to natural resources and of course political influence. According to Farry (2015) “By building and financing stadiums [...], China has given itself access not only to high offices of government and business, but also a strategic advantage for tender processes related to the mining of resources”. In that sense, the selection of recipients for Chinese aid in the form of stadiums is far from random; and while diplomatic recognition of China is of the utmost importance, relating to the ongoing aim to unify China through the One–China-Policy${}^5$ (Alm 2012), cultivating relationships with resource-rich nations is fundamental to the decision-making process (Will 2012). According to Alm (2012) despite China’s official offer of “no strings attached” more often than not the new stadiums are presented to the recipient countries as an exchange to cancel their diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In the same context Will (2012) notes that as China deepens its trade relations through infrastructural projects, the number of nations that recognize Taiwan gradually declines, for example, when a cascade of Caribbean islands changed alliances and recognized Beijing they simultaneously secured their own stadiums (Will 2012). Contrastingly, in 2006, when Kiribati switched loyalty from China to Taiwan, the $5.5 million-dollar grant was suspended, as was all work on the partially completed stadium (Murray 2018).

Relatedly, Will (2012) and Alm (2012) raise the issue of what happens to the new venues after their delivery, taking into consideration the fact that China constructs big stadiums, which entail large operational and maintenance costs, in nations with scarce financial resources. As a result, most of these new stadiums are left to decay pending an uncertain future. In Angola, for example, the four new stadiums built for the African Cup of Nations have slid into permanent decline (Will 2012). Furthermore, the issue of their often poor construction poses an additional problem. A telling example is the Kamanyola Stadium in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for which FIFA has issued a warning regarding its serious flaws and weaknesses threatening to close it for international games unless substantial improvements are made (Alm 2012).

6 Conclusion

The Olympics may have started out as an idealistic showcase of amateur sporting, yet, overtime new considerations emerged, which resulted in the attachment of increasingly large expectations to the Olympic project—a large part of whom has little to do with athletics per se. The extreme magnitude of the Games has made them

${}^5$The One-China Policy prevents the diplomatic recognition of both Beijing and Taipei simultaneously.

much more than a series of sports competitions. An examination of the Olympic history indicates that the Games served, in several occasions, as means for urban renewal and spatial development, as means for the attraction of tourists and international investments, as a nation branding exercise—through soft power and international prestige accumulation—or even as political instruments that provide, amongst other things, opportunities to develop a state's security apparatus and patronage to key allies. While the examination of the motivation for hosting the Olympics lies outside the scope of this paper, it should be stressed that the aspirations of the early organizers were quite disparate from their contemporaries, which in turn affected the growth of all Games-related areas.

Amongst other issues raised by scholars and Olympic commentators regarding the Games financing and legacy, a prominent issue of the Olympic gigantism is the parallel gigantomania of its facilities. While the expansion of venues to accommodate the growing popularity of certain sports is a valid reason, the excessive requirements of the IOC paired with the aspirations of the International Sports Federations, who wish to maximize exposure for their sport through the development of high-grade end expansive venues, results to the development of venues which almost always exceed the post-event needs (Alm et al. 2016; Pitts and Liao 2013). According to Koch and Valiyev (2016) when the venues are designed without proper assessment of local needs and demands they turn out to be too large, too expensive and/or unsuitable for post-event use. In the same vein Zimbalist (2010) contends that many facilities built especially for the Games go un- or under-utilized after the 16 or 17 days of the competition itself, yet they require vast amount of money to be maintained and they occupy increasingly scarce real estate.

What seems to have been forgotten along the way is the integral aim of a stadium, which is to serve as a place for sport and physical activity. These big, iconic, eye-catching projects or so called vanity or prestige projects may be hailed as marvels from a design perspective, yet according to Prasser (2007) too often become expensive “white elephants” requiring massive expenses for their day-to-day operation and maintenance; thus consuming more valuable resources that could have more effective uses. In light of the above Chapin (2004) went as far as to suggest that more often than not these venues “have acted like tumors for the city”, since their continuous up-keep drains the city from further financial and natural resources.

Mindful of the wider concerns regarding the size, the cost, the excessive requirements, the risk and the complexity of staging the Olympics the IOC broke with decades of tradition by announcing in September 2017 a double allocation of the Games (Paris 2024 and Los Angeles 2028) thus awarding for the first time the Olympics 11 years in advance; which was seen as a way to secure the future and the stability of the Olympic Games.

In the same vein, IOC agreed upon the Olympic Agenda 2020, which includes 40 recommendations addressing key areas such as: reducing bidding and general costs; reinforce flexibility; transparency; good governance and sustainability. What remains to be seen is whether all these recommendations will be put into action so that the decision to host the Olympics will not be bound to remain evermore as “the triumph of hope over experience”.

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